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ARTICLES
SELF-CENSORSHIP AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
ROBERT A. SEDLER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Self-censorship refers to the decision by an individual or
group to refrain from speaking and to the decision by a media
organization to refrain from publishing information. Whenever
an individual or group or the media engages in self-censorship,
the values of the First Amendment are compromised, because
the public is denied information or ideas.' It should not be sur-
prising, therefore, that the principles, doctrines, and precedents
of what I refer to as "the law of the First Amendment"' are
designed to prevent self-censorship premised on fear of govern-
mental sanctions against expression. This fear-induced self-cen-
sorship will here be called "self-censorship bad."
At the same time, the First Amendment also values and pro-
tects a right to silence. The components of the First Amendment
right to silence include: (1) the right to refuse to disclose one's
beliefs and associations to the government; (2) the right to speak
anonymously without disclosing one's identity; (3) the right not
to be compelled to speak the government's message; (4) the
* Distinguished Professor of Law, Wayne State University. A.B., 1956,
J.D., 1959, University of Pittsburgh.
1. It is an essential postulate of First Amendment theory that the primary
purpose of the First Amendment is to provide information and ideas to the
public, and that the right of the public to receive the information and the ideas
is of greater importance than the right of the speaker to convey information
and express ideas. The public interest, which lies at the heart of the First
Amendment, is deemed to be advanced by the free dissemination of informa-
tion and the free expression of ideas. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514
(2001) (holding that a federal wiretap law, which prohibited the illegal inter-
ception of telephone communications, cannot constitutionally be applied to
impose liability against a newspaper for broadcasting an illegally-intercepted
publication concerning a matter of public interest where organization had
played no role in the illegal interception).
2. Robert A. Sedler, The First Amendment in Litigation: The "Law of the First
Amendment, " 48 WASH. & LEE. L. REv. 457 (1991).
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right not to be associated with a particular idea; and (5) the right
to avoid unwanted ideas.' The values embodied in the First
Amendment right to silence support self-censorship in the sense
that an individual or group or a media organization may decide
to refrain from speaking or publishing, because he believes that
the public interest is better served by his decision to refrain from
speaking or publishing than by speaking or publishing. There-
fore, this will be called "self-censorship good."
This Article first discusses "self-censorship bad," including
the principles, doctrines, and precedents of the First Amend-
ment that are designed to prevent self-censorship due to the fear
of governmental sanctions against expression. I show that in
their totality, these principles, doctrines, and precedents com-
prise a major part of the "law of the First Amendment," and
stand as a bulwark against "self-censorship bad." The Article
then discusses "self-censorship good" in the context of media
organizations exercising their editorial discretion to refuse to
publish certain information. Here I use two examples. First is
the refusal of the media to identify victims of rape. Second is the
refusal of the media to disclose certain information on the
grounds that the disclosure of the information would cause seri-
ous harm to the national security. In this connection, I review at
length the process by which media organizations make the deci-
sion to refuse to disclose information on national security
grounds. The Article concludes by relating "self-censorship bad"
and "self-censorship good" to the values of the First Amendment
and the function of the First Amendment in the Nation's consti-
tutional system.
II. "SELF-CENSORSHIP BAD"
A. The Chilling Effect Concept
"Self-censorship bad" refers to decisions to refrain from
speaking or publishing due to the fear of governmental sanction
under a law prohibiting or regulating expression. One major
objective of the "law of the First Amendment" is preventing self-
censorship based on fear of governmental repercussions, an
objective that is accomplished through the chilling effect concept
that runs throughout the "law of the First Amendment." In my
3. See Robert A. Sedler, The First Amendment Right of Silence (Wayne State
Univ. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-39, Nov. 9, 2007), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1031505. See also W.
Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (state cannot force students to
salute the flag); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (state cannot require
citizens to display a message they do not wish to display).
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opinion, the chilling effect concept is the most fundamental and
pervasive concept in the "law of the First Amendment." Indeed it
is the only clear First Amendment concept that I have been able
to identify at the present time. The chilling effect concept is the
basis of the narrow specificity principle,' the overbreadth doc-
trine,5 and the New York Times rule.' In addition, the possibility of
a serious chilling effect on expression is also an independent
analytical basis for invalidating any kind of regulation of
expression.7
The primacy of the chilling effect concept is directly tracea-
ble to the context in which the "law of the First Amendment" has
developed. This area of law has been evolving for some ninety
years, and the primary context in which it developed for many of
those years was in response to governmental repression of dissent
and the expression of unpopular ideas.'
As the Supreme Court extended protection to freedom of
expression in this context, it promulgated the chilling effect con-
cept as well as principles and specific doctrines designed to
ensure that dissent can occur and unpopular ideas can be
expressed. The chilling effect concept, along with these princi-
ples and specific doctrines, applies across the board to any inter-
ference with freedom of expression and are the principal
vehicles by which the very strong protection of freedom of
expression is achieved in actual First Amendment litigation.'
And, in applying the chilling effect concept and its derivative
principles and doctrines, the Court has emphasized, again and
again, the dangers to freedom of expression that result from self-
censorship due to the fear of governmental sanction.
4. See infra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 21-32 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
7. See infra Part II.C.
8. See Sedler, supra note 2, at 462 n.21 (discussing the historical context of
the development of the "law of the First Amendment").
9. The Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment's guarantee
of freedom of expression very expansively; the protection afforded to it is per-
haps the strongest given to any individual right under the Constitution. In the
United States, as a constitutional matter, the value of freedom of expression
generally prevails over other democratic values, such as equality, human dig-
nity, and privacy. Other democratic values must be advanced by means that do
not abridge freedom of expression. It is for this reason that the constitutional
protection afforded to freedom of expression in the United States is seemingly
unparalleled anywhere else in the world, and why in the United States we pro-
vide more protection to freedom of expression than is provided under interna-
tional human rights norms. See generally Robert A. Sedler, An Essay on Freedom of
Speech: The United States Versus the Rest of the World, 2006 MIc-i. ST. L. REV. 377
(2006).
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B. The Narrow Specificity Principle, the Overbreadth Doctrine,
and the New York Times Rule
Under the narrow specificity principle, any governmental
regulation of expression will be found to violate the First Amend-
ment if it is "pursued by means that broadly stifle personal liber-
ties when the end can be more narrowly achieved."'o The
Court's explanation of the basis of the narrow specificity princi-
ple directly points to the chilling effect concerning self-censor-
ship caused by the breadth of the regulation. As the Court
stated: "Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing
space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with
narrow specificity."" A number of the cases in which the Court
has applied the narrow specificity principle to invalidate govern-
mental regulation of expression clearly demonstrate the concern
with preventing self-censorship. One in this set of cases involved
a state requirement that teachers list all of the organizations to
which they had belonged or contributed during the preceding
five years,' 2 and a state bar admission requirement that appli-
cants list all the organizations to which they belonged." Such a
requirement could cause teachers or bar applicants to refrain
from exercising their First Amendment right of freedom of asso-
ciation for fear of sanction due to their membership in a "disap-
proved" organization. Another set of cases involved absolute
bans on engaging in certain forms of expression, such as knock-
ing on the door or ringing the doorbell of a resident in order to
deliver handbills," or distributing leaflets in the public streets or
other public places." A similar case involved a municipal ordi-
nance requiring individuals to obtain a permit prior to engaging
in door-to-door advocacy and to display it on demand." The
absolute ban would necessarily inhibit persons from engaging in
10. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
11. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
12. Shelton, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
13. The only inquiry that the state can make of bar applicants is the appli-
cant's "knowing membership in an organization advocating the overthrow of
the Government by force or violence, . . . [and] sharing the specific intent to
further the organization's illegal purpose," in order to determine the appli-
cant's "character and fitness" to practice law. Law Students Civil Rights
Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 165 (1971) (citations omit-
ted). See also Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
14. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
15. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
16. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536
U.S. 150 (2002) (finding that the law was not narrowly tailored to advancing the
asserted interests in protecting the privacy of the residents and preventing
fraud and crime).
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the proscribed form of expression, and their resulting failure to
do so would constitute a form of self-censorship.
Still another set of cases involves bans on publication by the
media. These cases include: a ban on the publication of the
name of a victim of a sexual offense, as applied to a newspaper
that had obtained the name from an inadvertently-released
police report; 7 a law imposing liability for the public dissemina-
tion of the name of a rape victim where the name had been
obtained from public court documents;' 8 a law prohibiting news-
papers from publishing the name of a youth charged as a juve-
nile offender, as applied to information that the newspaper had
obtained from private sources; 1 and a law prohibiting the publi-
cation of information in confidential legal proceedings, as
applied to a non-participant who had lawfully obtained the infor-
mation.0 Such bans were designed to force the media to self-
censor with respect to the publication of this information, and so
would deprive the public of the self-censored information. It is
possible that in at least some of these cases, a more precisely tai-
lored restriction on the dissemination of the information may
have been constitutionally permissible. However, the regulation
at issue failed to satisfy the narrow specificity principle, and the
Court's invocation of the principle to invalidate the regulation
assured that the media would not be engaging in self-censorship.
The overbreadth doctrine is closely related to the narrow
specificity principle, and like the narrow specificity principle, is
grounded in a concern for preventing a chilling effect on pro-
tected expression. 21 The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines
operate to prevent a chilling effect that results from the existence
and threatened enforcement of overbroad and vague laws
directly regulating, or applicable to, acts of expression. These
doctrines allow such laws to be challenged on their face for sub-
stantial overbreadth or vagueness without regard to whether the
activity of the party challenging the law is itself constitutionally
protected."
17. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
18. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
19. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
20. Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
21. See Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 584 (1989) ("Overbreadth is
a judicially created doctrine designed to prevent the chilling of protected
expression.").
22. While the overbreadth doctrine has sometimes been explained by the
Court as an exception to the rule against asserting the rights of third parties, in
my opinion, it is more properly grounded in substantive terms. A party has a
substantive First Amendment right, grounded in the concern for preventing a
chilling effect on the exercise of that right, not to be subject to sanction under
2011]1 17
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The overbreadth doctrine is very important in practice, not
only because it permits a law to be invalidated through a facial
challenge without assessment of the constitutionality of the chal-
lenger's expressive activity, but because the constitutional analy-
sis does not go beyond the terms of the law itself. Moreover,
once a law is held void on its face for overbreadth, the law liter-
ally ceases to exist: it cannot be enforced against any person in
any circumstance. In applying the overbreadth doctrine, a court
must look to the terms of the law and must determine whether
the law includes or could reasonably be interpreted to include
within its prohibitions a substantial amount of protected expres-
sion." The more sweeping the terms of the law, the more likely
it is to include within its prohibitions protected expression, and
so the more likely it is to be found to be void on its face for
overbreadth.
The following are examples of where the Court has invoked
the overbreadth doctrine to invalidate laws on their face: a law
imposing an absolute ban on peaceful picketing;24 a law forbid-
a law that is void on its face. See Robert Allen Sedler, The Assertion of Constitu-
tional Jus Tertii: A Substantive Approach, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 1308, 1326-1327
(1982). In this connection, the Court has held that a party that is not subject to
sanction under the challenged law cannot assert an overbreadth challenge on
the ground that the law violates the First Amendment rights of third parties.
L.A. Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999) (hold-
ing that a party who wanted to obtain governmental information for purposes
not authorized by statute could not assert facial challenge to statutory
requirements).
23. The overbreadth must be "real [and] substantial ... in relation to the
statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615
(1973). In that case, the Court rejected an overbreadth challenge to a state law
prohibiting "partisan political activity" on the part of state civil service employ-
ees. The Court upheld the law on the ground that such partisan political activ-
ity could interfere with the impartial and efficient operation of the civil service,
and emphasized that the ban on such activity did not interfere with the ability
of civil service employees to express political views outside the context of a par-
tisan political campaign. The civil service employees who were challenging the
law had engaged in soliciting political contributions from subordinates. They
argued that the law could be interpreted as applying to activities such as wear-
ing campaign buttons or placing campaign signs on the bumpers of their auto-
mobiles. The Court held that if the law were ever applied to such activities, it
could be challenged as unconstitutional as applied to such activities, but that
this possible overbreadth was not substantial in relation to the law's plainly legit-
imate sweep. Id. See also Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113 (2003) (upholding
municipal law closing to public use streets adjacent to a municipal housing
development for low-income persons, in an effort to combat rampant crime
and drug dealing there, and rejecting an overbreadth challenge to the law
despite the possibility that it could be applied to bar a person seeking to come
to the development for expressive purposes).
24. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
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ding any person to "in any manner, oppose, molest, abuse or
interrupt any policeman in the execution of his duty";2 5 a law
forbidding the use of "opprobrious words or abusive language
tending to cause a breach of the peace";2' a law forbidding indi-
viduals to "assemble on the sidewalk and conduct themselves in a
manner annoying to persons passing by";27 a federal law banning
indecent interstate commercial messages;" and a federal law
"criminaliz[ing] the commercial creation, sale or possession of
certain depictions of animal cruelty."" In the 1950s and 1960s, a
number of states mandated that teachers and public employees
execute "loyalty oaths" containing provisions that required or
could be construed to require the declarant to refrain from
engaging in protected expression or association and thus were
void on their face for overbreadth.so In more recent times, the
overbreadth doctrine has been invoked to invalidate laws pro-
scribing sexual expression in terms that go beyond legally unpro-
tected obscenity.3 ' Similarly, efforts by public universities to
maintain political correctness, through the adoption of codes
that prohibit students from making statements that create a "hos-
tile, intimidating or offensive environment for minorities,
25. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987) (quoting Hous., Tix.,
CODE ORDINANCES § 34-11(a) (1984)).
26. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 519 (1972) (quoting GA. CODE ANN.
§ 26-6303 (1933)).
27. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 611 (1971) (quoting CIN-
CINNATI, OH., CODE ORDINANCES § 901-L6 (1956)).
28. Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
29. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1579 (2010) (citing 18
U.S.C. § 48 (2006)).
30. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Baggett v. Bullitt,
377 U.S. 360 (1964); Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961). A
loyalty oath requirement that is constitutionally permissible is an affirmative
oath by which a teacher or employee agrees to support the constitutional sys-
tem of government. See Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676 (1972).
31. See Am. Booksellers Ass'n. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985),
aff'd mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). The municipal ordinance in that case was a
civil rights anti-pornography ordinance that defined "pornography" as the
"graphic sexually explicit subordination of women." Id. at 324. The state can
only prohibit the kind of "pornography" that rises to the level of "obscenity," as
defined by the Court in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Id. Under the
Miller definition, a work is obscene and beyond the protection of the First
Amendment only if, taken as a whole, the dominant theme of the work appeals
to a "prurient" interest in sex, it is patently offensive to contemporary commu-
nity standards relating to the description or depiction of sexual activity, and it
lacks serious "literary, artistic, political or scientific value." Id. If a state law, like
the municipal ordinance at issue in this case, does not define "obscenity" in this
manner or fails to very precisely define the sexual activity that cannot be
described or depicted, it will be held void on its face for overbreadth. Id. at 331-
32.
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women, gay and lesbian persons and other protected groups,"
have run afoul of the overbreadth doctrine because the codes by
their very terms prohibit a substantial amount of protected
expression.32 As these examples demonstrate, the overbreadth
doctrine is a major vehicle by which the Court prevents self-cen-
sorship due to the existence and threatened enforcement of
overbroad and vague laws that regulate or are applicable to acts
of expression.
The New York Times rule, taking its name from New York Times
v. Sullivan," is also derived from the chilling effect concept. It
imposes stringent requirements in libel and other personal tort
actions brought by public officials and public figures against the
media or other speakers. In order to avoid a chilling effect on
the discussion of issues of public interest, the New York Times rule
mandates that there can be no recovery for false statements of
fact about public officials or public figures, unless the plaintiff
can prove with "convincing clarity" that the statement was know-
ingly false or made with reckless disregard for truth or falsity."
The New York Times rule also applies to actions for invasion of
privacy and the infliction of emotional distress." Moreover, the
rule imposes certain limitations on libel actions brought by pri-
vate figures against the media when the media has "publishe [d]
speech of public concern."" In such a case the plaintiff must
prove the falsity of the statement at issue, and there can be no
award of punitive damages unless the test of "knowing falsehood
or reckless disregard for the truth" has been satisfied." The
media, as expected, has adopted internal reporting and editing
procedures designed to ensure that the information they publish
is not actionable under the New York Times rule. The result is that
successful libel actions against media organizations are exceed-
32. See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
The author litigated the case as counsel for the plaintiff on behalf of the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union of Michigan. See asoDambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55
F.3d 1177 (6th Cir. 1995) (also litigated by the author); UMW Post, Inc. v. Bd.
of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991); Robert
A. Sedler, Doe v. University of Michigan and Campus Bans on "Racist Speech": The
View from Within, 37 WAYNE L. REv. 1325 (1991); Robert A. Sedler, The Unconsti-
tutionality of Campus Bans on "Racist Speech:" The View from Without and Within, 53
U. Prrr. L. REV. 631 (1992).
33. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
34. Id. at 285-86.
35. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
36. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986).
37. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
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ingly rare and the media need not engage in self-censorship for
fear of exposure to libel liability.
C. The Chilling Effect Concept as the Basis for Invalidating
the Regulation of Expression
The possibility of a serious chilling effect on expression can
be an analytical basis for invalidating any kind of regulation of
expression. There are numerous examples of the Court invali-
dating laws or governmental action on this basis, and in practice,
it is very difficult for the government tojustify a law or action that
has this effect on expression.
A state law requiring a newspaper to give a "right of reply" to
a political candidate it has attacked in print was found to violate
the First Amendment because such a requirement may discour-
age newspapers from attacking political candidates and so
deprives the public of this information." A federal law that only
permitted the delivery of mail designated as "communist political
propaganda" if specifically requested by the addressee in writing
was also invalidated.40 The law was found to violate the First
Amendment because it imposed "a limitation on the unfettered
exercise" of the right of free expression-willing recipients could
be inhibited from making a request for delivery, and to that
extent would engage in reverse self-censorship by denying them-
selves access to the information.
The chilling effect concept has been invokcd in a number of
contexts to invalidate governmental efforts to prohibit constitu-
tionally unprotected obscenity, where those efforts could have a
chilling effect on the dissemination of constitutionally protected
pornography." An early example of this situation was a state law
giving a governmental agency the power to designate certain
books as "objectionable," to circulate a list of these books to the
police, and to threaten to recommend prosecution against book-
38. For an example of how difficult it is for a media organization to be
held liable, see Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001), which held that the
federal wiretap law, which prohibits the illegal interception of telephone com-
munications, could not constitutionally be applied to impose liability against a
newspaper for broadcasting an illegally intercepted communication concerning
a matter of public interest, notwithstanding that the newspaper had reason to
believe that the communication had been illegally intercepted.
39. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
40. Lamont v. Postmaster-General, 381 U.S. 301, 305 (1965).
41. Id.
42. All pornography (except child pornography) that does not rise to the
level of "obscenity" is, of course, protected by the First Amendment. See Am.
Booksellers Ass'n. v. Hudnut. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd mem., 475 U.S.
1001 (1986).
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sellers that sold these books." In order to avoid the threat of
prosecution, booksellers were likely to refuse to carry any books
on the list, even though at least some of the books on the list
were not obscene. 4
Similarly, the Court in Freedman v. Maryland" invoked the
chilling effect concept to invalidate the traditional practice of
state censorship of motion pictures, which effectively brought
about the end of state motion picture censorship boards. These
boards typically would require that the filmmaker obtain a
license from the board prior to distributing the film to theaters
in the state. While in theory, the board could only refuse to issue
a license if it found the motion picture to be obscene, in practice
the boards would frequently demand that in order to receive the
license, the filmmaker make changes in the film that would sat-
isfy the board's notion of appropriateness. Even if the filmmaker
were to bring a successful court challenge to the board's refusal
to issue the license, the resulting delay in distributing the film
would have a significant economic impact on the filmmaker, and
in order to avoid this delay, the filmmaker would likely agree to
the changes demanded by the censorship board. Thus, the film-
maker would be engaging in self-censorship, and would not show
the film that he wanted to show. In Freedman, the Court held that
if a censorship board wanted to deny a license to distribute a film
on the ground that the film was obscene, the board had to initi-
ate an expeditious and adversarial judicial proceeding to deter-
mine the alleged obscenity of the film." The principle from
Freedman was that there could be no advance prohibition of the
dissemination of a film or any other work alleged to be obscene
unless and until there had been an expeditious judicial determi-
nation of "obscenity" in an adversarial proceeding initiated by
the governmental body.4 Since the censorship board could no
43. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
44. Id. at 71 (noting that this will leave book distributor's to "speculate"
whether books were obscene or not).
45. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
46. Id. Interestingly enough, the Freedman decision imposed as a constitu-
tional requirement a prior judicial determination of obscenity in an adversary
proceeding that the Court had previously upheld against a First Amendment
challenge. See Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957) (upholding a
state law against a First Amendment challenge that provided for the judicial
determination of a book as "obscene" and the issuance of an injunction against
the dissemination of a book determined to be "obscene" holding that because
the book had been determined to be "obscene" in an adversary proceeding, it
was not protected speech, and an injunction against its dissemination did not
violate the prior restraint doctrine).
47. 380 U.S. at 58.
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longer force the filmmaker to engage in self-censorship in order
to avoid a delay in the distribution of the film, and since no film
produced by a major studio would be found to be obscene,"
there was no reason for the state to continue to engage in
motion picture censorship, and state censorship boards have
ceased to exist.49
The Court has struck down Congress' efforts to protect
minors from exposure to sexually explicit materials on the
Internet because of a concern for self-censorship on the part of
the disseminators of those materials. The Court has held the
First Amendment was violated by a federal law that prohibited
the transmission of "indecent messages to any recipient under 18
years of age," and "knowingly sending . . . or displaying . . .
'patently offensive' material in a manner available to persons
under 18 years of age."o The problem with this kind of law is
that existing technology does not include any effective method
for the disseminator to prevent minors from obtaining access to
its Internet communications without at the same time denying
access to adults. The law was unconstitutional because it would
discourage the disseminators from sending sexually explicit
materials onto the Internet even though adults could rightly see
those materials, and the law would thus deny those adults access
to those materials.
A final example of the Court's concern for preventing self-
censorship is the Court's holding that a state law requiring politi-
cal parties to report the names of their campaign contributors
and recipients of campaign disbursements could not constitu-
48. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974) (holding that as a
matter of law, under the Roth-Miller test, the motion picture Carnal Knowledge
was not obscene). No more cases involving obscenity prosecutions against
major studio films came before the Court.
49. The "Freedman procedures" are also constitutionally required for pos-
tal stop orders and customs seizures of allegedly obscene materials. Blount v.
Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S.
363 (1971).
50. Ashcroftv. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 567 (2002) (citing
47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (2000)).
51. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). See also Ash-
croft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) (indicating that any
efforts to regulate the Internet dissemination of sexually-oriented materials to
minors would probably violate the First Amendment, since filtering materials
could be used to block such material at the receiving end). Also note that it has
long been settled that the government cannot deny adults access to sexually
explicit materials on the ground that the government is trying to protect
minors from access to those materials. See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380
(1957) (holding that state could not constitutionally ban sales to the general
public of material "unsuitable for children").
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tionally be applied to a minor political party, where the party
showed a "reasonable probability" that such disclosure would
subject the contributors to "threats, harassment or reprisals"
from government officials or private persons.
These examples demonstrate how the possibility of a serious
chilling effect on expression is an analytical basis for invalidating
any kind of regulation of expression. In these cases, the result of
the Court's decisions was to prevent any self-censorship of
expression resulting from the existence and enforcement of the
challenged laws or governmental action.
The cases demonstrate how the Court has used the chilling
effect concept and the principles and doctrines based on that
concept to protect against what we have called "self-censorship
bad." The result of the Court's doing so has been to advance the
public interest in the dissemination of information and ideas,
and so to implement strongly the values of the First Amendment.
III. "SELF-CENSORSHIP GooD"
A. The Media and Editorial Discretion
We rely on the media to advance the public information
function of the First Amendment by using its newsgathering
resources to collect information and express opinions about mat-
ters of public interest and to convey them to the public at large.
But the First Amendment also embodies a right to silence, and in
performing its public information function, the media may also
decide to invoke its right to silence. The media's exercise of its
right to silence is reflected in the media's editorial discretion. A
media organization may decide that it is in the public interest for
it to refuse to disclose particular information that is in its posses-
sion, and when it chooses to exercise editorial discretion by refus-
ing to disclose that information, it has concluded that in the
circumstances presented, other values, such as a concern for an
individual's privacy or a concern for national security, outweigh
the public's interest in obtaining that information." The exer-
52. Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 101
(1982). But see Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) (holding that the danger of
a chilling effect on expression was not created, at least on the face of the law, by
a state law requiring the public disclosure of petitions supporting a referendum
on a state law, including the names and addresses of the signers, and so held
that the law on its face did not violate the First Amendment).
53. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm. v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (rec-
ognizing the right of editorial discretion as a basis for its decision); FCC v.
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (same); Columbia Broad. Sys. v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117-18 (1973) (discussing the right of
editorial discretion).
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cise of editorial discretion to decide not to publish is an impor-
tant component of First Amendment rights and, as a general
proposition, the media cannot be compelled to disclose informa-
tion that it does not wish to disclose. 4
When a media organization exercises editorial discretion by
refusing to publish information in its possession, it is necessarily
engaging in self-censorship. I refer to this form of self-censor-
ship as "self-censorship good" because here the media is itself
making the decision not to publish and, in doing so, it has con-
cluded that under the circumstances, other values outweigh the
public's interest in obtaining that information. Two specific
examples of editorial discretion illustrate this "self-censorship
good:" the refusal to disclose the identity of rape victims, and the
refusal to disclose certain information that would be harmful to
national security.
B. The Refusal to Disclose the Identity of Rape Victims
Published reports on crimes usually include identifying
information about the victim, including the victim's name. With-
out such identifying information, the reporting would be incom-
plete, and the victim would be an abstraction rather than a real
person. It is difficult to see any justification for refusing to dis-
close the identity of the victim, particularly since that identity will
be disclosed during any criminal prosecution of the perpetrator.
A different set of considerations comes into play when the
crime is one of rape. There is considerable controversy over
whether the media should refuse to identify rape victims." One
view is that the media's failure to disclose the name puts the rape
victim in a category apart from other violent crime victims,
thereby perpetuating society's incorrect impressions and stereo-
types about rape. The contrary view maintains that precisely
because of these incorrect impressions and stereotypes about
rape, from the perspective of the victim, rape is indeed different
from other violent crimes. But regardless of the incorrect
54. But see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (the media's right to
refuse to disclose information is qualified as the media cannot claim greater
First Amendment rights than the public at large have. For example, since mem-
bers of the public can be compelled to testify before a grand jury, so can mem-
bers of the media, and the Court has held that reporters called to testify before
a grand jury and can be compelled to reveal information derived from confi-
dential sources). To this extent, the media can be required to disclose informa-
tion that it does not wish to disclose.
55. See Michelle Johnson, How Identifying Rape Victim Affects Readers'Percep-
tions, 20.2 NEWSPAPER REs. J. 64 (1999) (discussing the identification of rape
victims in terms of the impact of identification on readers' perceptions).
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impressions and stereotypes, the fact remains that rape is per-
ceived by many persons as an extreme violation of the personal
integrity and sexuality of the victim, and that disclosing the name
of the victim may intensify the potential stigma and long term
trauma experienced by the victim."
As discussed previously, governmental efforts to prevent dis-
closure of the names of rape victims have been held to violate the
First Amendment.51 It is precisely because the government can-
not constitutionally protect rape victims from such disclosure
that any responsibility for doing so lies with the media. Here the
media must make the decision whether the public interest in
knowing the identity of the victim outweighs the interest of the
rape victim in keeping her identity secret.5 1
Because the determination of this matter involves a conflict
between the public's interest in obtaining the information and
the victim's interest in keeping her identity secret, it would seem
that the determination whether to disclose should depend on
the particular factual circumstances surrounding the offense and
the victim. In my opinion, the case against disclosure is the
strongest where the particular factual circumstances would likely
lead to stigmatization of the victim, such as where the claimed
rape was committed by an acquaintance or a relative, and there
could be a question as to whether there was consent by the vic-
tim.59 Similarly, if the reporter had interviewed the victim, the
reporter could determine whether the victim had strong fears
about disclosure of her identity, and if so, there would be a
strong reason not to disclose her identity."o On the other hand,
56. See Deborah W. Denno, Privacy Rights of Rape Victims in the Media and
the Law: Perspectives on Disclosing Rape Victims' Names, 61 FORD. L. REv. 1113,
1123-31 (1993) (discussing fully the conflicting views about disclosure of the
identity of the rape victim). See also Roger Cohen, Should the Media Name the
Accuser When the Crime Being Charged is Rape?, N.Y. TimEs, Apr. 21, 1991, at A4;
Kelly McBride, Rethinking Rape Coverage: Should Anonymity Be Absolute, Quu
MAc., Oct.-Nov. 2002, at 8.
57. See Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469 (1975).
58. It is beyond the scope of this Article and the competence of the
author to resolve the conflicting positions on this very important matter.
Rather, my focus will be on the exercise of editorial discretion and on the pro-
cess by which media organizations make the determination to release or with-
hold the name of the rape victim.See
59. See Dana Berliner, Rethinking the Reasonable Belief Defense to Rape, 100
YAu, L.J. 2687, 2687 (1991); Denno, supra note 56, at 1125 ("[T]he great
majority of rapes are committed by an acquaintance or relative and, therefore,
the consent of the victim is often presumed.").
60. Denno, supra note 56, at 1125 ("[A] three-year longitudinal survey of
a national probability sample of 4008 adult American women . . . concluded
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disclosure would be more justified if the reporter had inter-
viewed the victim and she did not strongly object to disclosure,
which may occur where the victim was raped by a stranger and no
one would likely question whether there had been consent."
Finally, where the alleged rapist is a public figure who has
claimed that the sex was consensual, there may be a stronger
public interest in revealing identifying information about the
claimant, so that the public may make its own judgment about
the claimed consent." But in the final analysis, as stated above,
the media organization must make the decision on the basis of
the particular factual circumstances surrounding the offense and
that[:] '[i]t is clear that rape victims are extremely concerned about people
finding out and finding reasons to blame them for the rape. If the stigma of rape
were not still a very real concern in the victims' eyes, perhaps fewer victims in
America would be concerned about invasion of their privacy and other disclo-
sure issues.'" (citing NAT'L Vicrim CTR. & CRIME VicrIMs RESEARCH TREAT-
MENT CTR., RAPE IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATION (1992)).
61. But see Paul Marcus & Tara L. McMahon, Limiting Disclosure of Rape
Victims' Identities, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1019, 1033 (1991) (concluding that the
majority of rape victims who voluntarily reveal their identities "are white, mid-
dle class women in stable relationships" and, most significantly, are raped by
strangers, because it is far less likely that these women will be stigmatized by the
rape).
62. In 1991, a member of the Kennedy family, William Kennedy Smith,
was accused of raping a woman whom he had met at a bar in Florida, and was
subsequently acquitted. A number of media organizations disclosed her name,
while others did not. See Denno, supra note 56, at 1114.
In 2003, Los Angeles Lakers' basketball superstar Kobe Bryant was prose-
cuted in a Colorado State court on a charge of raping a young woman at a
resort where she was working. He admitted that he had sex with the woman,
but claimed that the sex was consensual. Most of the media refused to disclose
her name, but it was disclosed by a Los Angeles-based, nationally-syndicated
radio talk show host, who said he did not believe the woman's story. The trial
judge imposed a constitutionally questionable gag order against the media's
revealing her name, which was upheld by the Colorado Supreme Court. The
prosecution was dropped when the complainant refused to testify. She filed a
civil suit for damages in a Colorado federal court, and the judge required that
she reveal her name. No doubt, because Bryant was a very prominent athlete,
there was much controversy over the refusal of most of the media to reveal the
complainant's name, and the case sparked extensive public and media discus-
sion over the media practice of refusing to reveal the name of a rape victim.
See, e.g., Kirk Johnson, As Accuser Balks, Prosecutors Drop Bryant Rape Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 2, 2004, at Al; Kirk Johnson, Name of Bryant Case Accuser Is Again
Mistakenly Released, N.Y. TIMEs, July 29, 2004, at A16; Adam Liptak, Privacy
Rights, Fair Trials, Celebrities and the Press, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2004, at A20; How-
ard Pankratz & Mike McPhee, Bryant Settles Lawsuit, DENVER POST, Mar. 3, 2005,
at A-01; Kate Zernike, The Nation: What Privacy? Everything Else But the Name, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 3, 2003, § 4, at 4; Lauren Johnston, Kobe Accuser Reveals Identity, CBS
NEWS (Oct. 15, 2004), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/ 2 004/10/05/
national/main647384.shtml; Rape Case Against Bryant Dismissed, MSNBC NEws
(Sep. 2, 2004, 4:14 PM), http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/5861 3 7 9 /.
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surrounding the victim. And the media organization should
explain the reasons for its decision to withhold the name or to
reveal it to the public.
In my opinion, one of the best examples of editorial discre-
tion in this area was the decision of the New York Times and other
newspapers not to reveal the identity of woman known only as
the "Central Parkjogger." In 1989, a young woman who was jog-
ging in New York City's Central Park, was raped, severely beaten
and left for dead by a group of wilding young men." When her
assailants were prosecuted, she appeared in court and testified,
although as a result of her severe beating, she could not remem-
ber any of the facts of her assault. Although her name was availa-
ble from the court documents, editors of the New York Times and
many other newspapers made the decision to keep her identity
secret." The New York Times explained its decision in an
editorial:
The young woman who was raped, beaten and left for
dead this spring in Central Park is known to most New
Yorkers only as "the jogger." For a rape victim to want to
remain anonymous and for the media to keep her so, is
not unusual. Rape, even today, stigmatizes.
This time, though, the decision to remain nameless
was not made by the young woman but by her family.
When found, she was half-frozen, unconscious, past decid-
ing anything. . . . Moreover she has triumphed.
This week, back at work on a limited basis, she and her
parents thanked the media for their discretion and they
asked that it be maintained. Her continued recovery, they
said, "is highly dependent on maintaining both her ano-
nymity and her privacy."
The jogger got a lot of press because she is white,
affluent and works on Wall Street. But in remaining anon-
ymous she has, however, surmounted categorization. With-
out a name, one that might indicate ethnic origin and even
a religion, we can perceive her for what she really is: a
woman, who like countless women of every race and faith,
has suffered a horrendous cruelty.
Today the jogger is, in Dickens's phrase, "recalled to
life." Even so, there is a part of life that is dead to her. She
can't remember what happened that night. But if she
63. See, e.g., Craig Wolff, Youths Rape and Beat Central Park jogger, N.Y.
TIMEs, April 21, 1989, at B1.
64. See Alex S. Jones, Most Papers Won't Name the Jogger, N.Y. TIEs, June
13, 1990, at B3.
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can't, the rest of us must-for her sake and for the sake of
all those women who never make the paper or the 6
o'clock news but who know what it is to be treated like an
object.65
The decision of the New York Times and other news organiza-
tions not to reveal the name of the victim of this horrendous
attack has served to call attention to the plight of all women who
have been raped, and so has served the public information func-
tion of the First Amendment far more effectively than if they had
chosen to reveal the name of the victim. And, as this example
indicates, there will clearly be circumstances where editorial dis-
cretion dictates that the media should exercise that discretion to
refuse to reveal the name of the rape victim. Under the First
Amendment, that decision is for the media and the media alone
to make.
C. The Refusal to Disclose Information That Would Be
Harmful to National Security
Perhaps even more controversial than the refusal to disclose
the name of a rape victim is the refusal to disclose information
that the media has concluded would be harmful to national
security. In the first place, information that the media volunta-
rily refuses to disclose on this basis often relates to important
questions of public policy. One concern is that the media's
refusal to disclose this information enables the government to
keep secret information that the public rightly should have in
order to evaluate the government's actions. Secondly, the
media's voluntary refusal to disclose information on national
security grounds becomes intertwined with the government's
efforts to prevent the disclosure of such information.6 6
65. Editorial, The Jogger, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1989, § 1, at 26.
66. For a discussion of the relationship between the government and the
media with respect to obtaining information that may affect national security,
see Robert A. Sedler, The Media and National Security, 53 WAYNE L. REV. 1025,
1034-38 (2007). Sometimes the relationship between government and media
is "adversarial," such as when the media obtains "unauthorized disclosures
leaks" from officials inside the government, and when the government seeks to
obtain information from the media that it is entitled to obtain from the general
public in the form of compelling members of the media to testify before a
grand jury and reveal information obtained from confidential sources. Some-
times that relationship is "symbiotic," such as when there is an "authorized
leak," by which government officials voluntarily disclose information to the
media, so that the media will assist them in conveying the government's mes-
sage to the public. A further discussion of this matter is beyond the scope of
the present Article.
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The First Amendment generally precludes the government
from trying to prevent the media from publishing information
on purported national security grounds. Stated simply, there is
no "national security" or "state secrets" exception to the require-
ments of the First Amendment. This proposition follows from
the Supreme Court's landmark 1971 decision, New York Times Co.
v. United States (Pentagon Papers Case) .17 The Supreme Court
applied the prior restraint doctrine to hold that a court could
not issue an injunction against the publication of the Pentagon
Papers, a classified study detailing the American government's
decision-making process in Vietnam." The government argued
that the publication of this document-highlighting many mis-
takes in that process-would seriously impair the ability of the
United States to negotiate a peace settlement with the North
Vietnamese government. This argument was insufficient to jus-
tify a prior restraint, since, as Justice Brennan pointed out, "the
First Amendment tolerates absolutely no prior judicial restraints
of the press predicated upon surmise or conjecture that unto-
ward consequences may result."" The only circumstances in
which a prior restraint could be justified, according to Justice
Note that the article title The Media and National Security was taken from a
symposium panel of the same name, which was a part of a symposium held on
November 16, 2006 that was sponsored by the Wayne Law Review and was enti-
tled, "Issues in the War on Terror: Investigations, the Media and Article III
Courts." I moderated the panel. The participants were William Harlow, the
former Chief Spokesman for the Central Intelligence Agency, Dana Priest, a
Pulitzer Prize winner and Washington Post Reporter, covering the intelligence
community and national security issues, and Adam Liptak, the National Legal
Correspondent for the New York Times. Much of the material in that article
was based on the research that I did in connection with presiding over this
Panel. In the course of the article I referred to certain points that were made
during the panel discussion, but I made no attempt to obtain statements or
specific information from the participants on the panel. I will refer to some of
these points in the present Article.
67. 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring) ("The government's
power to censor the press was abolished so that the press would remain forever
free to censure the Government. The press was protected so that it could bare
the secrets of government and inform the people.").
68. Id. at 714 (per curiam).
69. Id. at 725-26 (Brennan, J., concurring). Cf Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S.
280 (1981) (upholding the revocation of a passport of a former C.I.A. agent
who wrote a book disclosing secret intelligence operations and the names of
C.I.A. agents for the purpose of obstructing intelligence operations and the
recruiting of intelligence personnel); United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F.
Supp. 990, 1995 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (issuing an injunction against the publication
of a magazine article dealing with the development and production of thermo-
nuclear weapons on the ground that publication of the article would contribute
to nuclear proliferation and that would "adversely affect the national security of
the United States." The government abandoned its case against the magazine
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Stewart in his concurrence, would be where Congress has acted
specifically to prevent the disclosure of information that would
"surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to
our Nation or its people."O This formulation is the test used to
determine when it is constitutionally permissible for a court to
issue an injunction against the publication of information alleg-
edly harmful to "national security.""
The First Amendment would not likely tolerate post-publica-
tion sanctions against the media based on conjecture that disclo-
sure of the particular information would be harmful to national
security. It is unlikely that the government could constitutionally
impose post-publication sanctions unless it could make a strong
showing that the information was of such a nature that its disclo-
sure would cause "direct, immediate and irreparable damage" to
a particular national security interest." In other words, the con-
stitutional permissibility of post-publication sanctions would be
subject to the clear and present danger doctrine, and in this con-
after it was discovered that information similar to what the government sought
to enjoin was available in a government library elsewhere).
70. Pentagon Papers Case, 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring). The
holding of the Court in the Pentagon Papers Case is based on the opinion of
Justice Stewart, joined by Justice White, since their position represents the nar-
rowest ground of agreement among the Justices who concurred in the judg-
ment. The Court issued a per curiam opinion to the effect that the government
had not met the heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of a
prior restraint. Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White and Marshall
concurred in the per curiam opinion. Justices Black, id. at 714-20 (Black, J.,
concurring), and Douglas, id. at 720-24 (DouglasJ., concurring ), emphasized
that the First Amendment made no exception for national security and indi-
cated that a prior restraint would never be justified on national security
grounds. Justice Brennan agreed that no prior restraint was permissible, except
possibly in time of war with respect to the disclosure of troop movements or the
like. Id. at 725 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justices Stewart and White con-
curred on narrower grounds, saying that a prior restraint was not permissible in
this case, because Congress had not acted specifically to prevent the disclosure
of this information and because it could not be said that the disclosure of this
information "will surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to
our Nation or its people." Id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring).
71. An example of a permissible prior restraint under this highly exacting
standard, analogous to the disclosure of troop movements discussed by Justice
Brennan in the Pentagon Papers Case, id. at 725-27, would be the publication of
the names of CIA agents working undercover in foreign countries, since the
disclosure would create a specific threat of harm to the agents themselves and
to the intelligence-gathering activities of the agents by 'blowing their cover,'
Haig, 453 U.S. at 280. But absent the disclosure of information having this kind
of extremely harmful effect, the First Amendment precludes the issue of an
injunction against the publication of information on purported "national secur-
ity" grounds.
72. Pentagon Papers Case, 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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text, what constitutes a clear and present danger to national
security would be defined by the standard formulated in Justice
Stewart's concurrent to the Pentagon Papers Case.73
Likewise, there is no "state secrets" exception to the First
Amendment. That is, the fact that particular information has
been classified as "secret" by the government does not mean that
Congress can prohibit its disclosure. Rather, the disclosure of
classified information can be prohibited only when the govern-
ment makes a showing that the disclosure of the particular classi-
fied information would cause "direct, immediate and irreparable
damage" to an identifiable national security interest. Two of the
provisions of the federal law prohibiting the disclosure of classi-
fied information can satisfy this test: (1) the prohibition on dis-
closure of "the nature, preparation, or use of any code, cipher, or
cryptographic system of the United States or any foreign govern-
ment"; and (2) the prohibition on disclosure of "the design, con-
struction, use, maintenance, or repair of any device, apparatus,
or appliance used or prepared or planned for use by the United
States or any foreign government for cryptographic or communi-
cation intelligence purposes."74 These are very narrow prohibi-
tions, and the disclosure of this kind of information could cause
very serious harm to intelligence gathering activities.7 5
However, the two other provisions of the federal disclosure
of classified information law are overly broad. These provisions
prohibit:
[K]nowingly and willfully ... publish [ing] ... in any man-
ner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States
or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detri-
ment of the United States any classified information ...
(3) concerning the communication intelligence activ-
ities of the United -States or any foreign government; or
73. Id. The clear and present danger doctrine has developed primarily in
the context of determining when the government can constitutionally prohibit
the advocacy of unlawful action, such as the violent overthrow of the govern-
ment. Under the clear and present danger test, advocacy of unlawful action is
constitutionally protected except where the advocacy is directed toward inciting
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. See Bran-
denburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). See also Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105
(1973) (holding that threats of violence made by university students during an
anti-war demonstration were neither directed nor likely to incite "imminent
lawless action").
74. 18 U.S.C. § 798(a)(1)-(2) (2006).
75. It is difficult to see any responsible reporter seeking to obtain or
report information about governmental codes or cryptographic systems. It
would also seem that there is very little public interest in knowing about this
kind of information.
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(4) obtained by the processes of communication
intelligence from the communications of any foreign
government.16
The reason that these provisions could not be invoked against
the dissemination of classified information by the media is that
either (1) they would be void on their face for overbreadth, if
they were not interpreted as embodying the clear and present
danger test,77 or (2) if they were interpreted as embodying that
exacting test, it is very unlikely that any particular publication
would fall within the prohibition. Because two provisions of the
federal disclosure of classified information law are very narrow
and only prohibit the disclosure of information that no responsi-
ble journalist would want to disclose, and because two others are
overly broad and could not constitutionally be invoked against
the kinds of information that the media in fact would publish, it
is not surprising that there are not reported prosecutions against
members of the media for a violation of this law.
The point to be emphasized, then, is that there is no
national security or state secrets exception to the requirements
of the First Amendment and that, with very limited exceptions,
the government cannot prevent or sanction the disclosure of
information by the media on the ground that the disclosure is
harmful to national security. This being so, if the media will not
disclose information on the ground that the disclosure is harm-
ful to national security, it can only be because the media, in the
exercise of its editorial discretion, has concluded that the harm
to the national security from the disclosure of the particular
information outweighs the public's interest in obtaining the
information.
The First Amendment strongly embodies the principle of
editorial discretion and the right to decide what to publish or not
publish." Reporters and editors are acting in the best traditions
of the First Amendment and in accordance with their role in
advancing the function of freedom of expression in a democratic
and open society if they decide that particular information
76. § 798(a)(3)-(4).
77. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 ("[T]he constitutional guarantees of
free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy
of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action.").
78. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998);
FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984); Columbia Broad. Sys. v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117-18 (1973).
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should not be published because its disclosure would seriously
harm the public interest in national security.
A little-known example of the media's exercising editorial
discretion in refusing to publish information that would seriously
harm the public interest in national security is the media's main-
taining secrecy about the Manhattan Project that led to the devel-
opment of the atomic bomb in World War II. The story of the
media's silence about the Manhattan Project was recently
detailed in a book, Necessary Secrets, authored by Gabriel Schoen-
feld, who has been a strong critic of what he considers to be the
media's current willingness to publish "governmental secrets."79
As Schoenfeld has explained it, what he calls "the patriotic press"
cooperated with the government to maintain the greatest secrecy
possible about the Manhattan Project. Although Congress had
given President Roosevelt the authority to prevent disclosure of
"military information," which Roosevelt interpreted to include
information about the Manhattan Project at the Los Alamos,
New Mexico facility, Roosevelt relied on the voluntary coopera-
tion of the media rather than on any legal sanctions to prevent
disclosure of information about the Manhattan Project.
The first line of defense against disclosure was the imposi-
tion of a regime of control at the facility, with extensive security
requirements for those working at the facility and compart-
mentalization of the scientific activity conducted there.so The
next line of defense was the voluntary cooperation of the media.
Shortly after the attack at Pearl Harbor and the declaration of
war against the Axis Powers, Congress passed the First War Pow-
ers Act, which included a provision for press censorship, and
Roosevelt issued an Executive Order establishing an Office of
Censorship to organize the system. The President declared that
"[it is necessary to the national security that military informa-
tion which might be of aid to the enemy be scrupulously with-
held at the source" and that he was calling upon the "patriotic
press and radio to abstain voluntarily from the dissemination of
detailed information of certain kinds.""' The media were issued a
"Voluntary Censorship Code" that they were asked to follow.
The Office of Censorship lacked the power to punish violators,
but it could "disclos[e] their names . . . [and] could also refer
79. GABRIEL SCHOENFELD, NECESSARY SECRETS: NATIONAL SECURITY, THE
MEDIA, AND THE RULE OF LAw (2010).
80. Id. at 142-45.
81. Id. at 145-46. See also MICHAEL S. SWEENEY, SEcRETS OF VICTORY: THE
OFFICE OF CENSORSHIP AND THE AMERICAN PRESS AND RADIO IN WORLD WAR 11 35
(2001).
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them . . . to the Justice Department for prosecution under the
Espionage Act."82
Schoenfeld goes on to explain that in order for the govern-
ment to keep information about the Manhattan Project secret
from the public, it was necessary for the Office of Censorship to
inform the media in considerable detail about what they could
not publish or discuss." In addition, according to Schoenfeld:
The Office of Censorship wisely tolerated some release of
information, recognizing, as an official postwar study of
security arrangements noted, "that complete suppression
of information about activities at these locations would
actually draw more attention than a policy of judicious
release or news of local interest, carefully controlled so as
not to reveal any vital secrets."84
Schoenfeld concludes: "By and large the system of censorship
was highly successful. Journalists, conceiving of themselves in
that distant era not as neutral observers, but as an integral part of
the war effort, were eager to comply.""
There can be no doubt that the exercise of editorial discre-
tion by the media in maintaining secrecy about the Manhattan
Project truly advanced the interest in national security. The Axis
Powers and the rest of the world were kept in the dark about the
atomic bomb until it was dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in
the summer of 1945, which brought about the immediate surren-
der of Japan. This exercise of editorial discretion by the media
stands as a classic example of "self-censorship good."
The world today is a very different world from the time of
World War II, and there is no longer the conception of the
82. SCHOENFELD, supra note 79, at 146.
83. For example, in June 1943, the media "were asked to refrain from
public discussion of 'new or secret military weapons or experiments.'" Id. at
147. The censorship mandate laid out certain extremely sensitive information,
proscribing references to: "(The production] or utilization of atom smashing,
atomic energy, atomic fission, atomic splitting, or any of their equivalents. The
use for military purposes of radium or radioactive materials, heavy water, high
voltage discharge equipment, cyclotrons. The following elements or any of
their compounds: plutonium, uranium, ytterbium, hafnium, protactinium,
radium, thorium, deuterium." Id.
84. Id. at 148-49 (quoting VINCENT C. JONES, MANHATTAN: THE ARMY AND
THE AToMIc BoMB 278 (1985)).
85. SCHOENFELD, supra note 79, at 147. Schoenfeld notes that while there
were more than a few breaches of the censorship regime, they "stemmed from
the sheer impracticability of walling off an enterprise of such scope," and when
they did occur, "[a]gents from the Office of Censorship swooped in to trace the
source of the leaks, to try to contain the story, and to warn the editors and
broadcasters away from a repetition of the violation." Id. at 148-49.
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"patriotic press." The media no longer hesitates to publish "mili-
tary secrets" or other confidential information that has been
leaked to it by disaffected government employees or others. The
claim of the government that disclosure of this information
would somehow harm national security is greeted with skepti-
cism, particularly where the information reveals serious mistakes
or wrongdoing on the part of government officials. This was the
situation presented in the Pentagon Papers Case, the disclosure by
the New York Times of the National Security Agency's domestic
surveillance program, under which it intercepted communica-
tions to the United States from suspected terrorists abroad with-
out obtaining a warrant from the Foreign Surveillance
Intelligence Court," and most recently, by the Internet leak of
some 91,000 classified documents on the Afghanistan war and
250,000 American diplomatic cables by WikiLeaks, a self-
described whistleblower organization." It is fair to say, then, that
as a general proposition, today the media is very reluctant to
exercise its editorial discretion to refuse to disclose classified
information despite the government's claim that disclosure of
the information will be harmful to national security.
At the same time, the media insists that sometimes it will exer-
cise its editorial discretion to withhold or delay the publication of
particular information on national security grounds. A media
organization is most likely to exercise its editorial discretion on
this basis when its reporters or editors have engaged in discus-
sions with government officials, and have been persuaded that
disclosure of the particular information will in fact cause serious
harm to the national security.88
86. See generally SCHOENFELD, supra note 79, at 17-53. Perhaps unsurpris-
ingly, Schoenfeld is highly critical of the New York Times' decision to disclose the
existence of the program, and he has used this example to argue for greater
accountability in the press corps for publishing wartime military secrets. See also
Gabriel Schoenfeld, Has the "New York Times" Violated the Espionage Act?, Com
MENT. MAG., Mar. 2006, at 23.
87. See Anne Flaherty, Pentagon Scrambles to Assess Wikileaks Damage, Associ-
ATED PRESS, July 26, 2010, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/
2010/jul/25/90000-us-documents-on-afghan-war-leaked-to-website; Eric
Schmitt, In Disclosing Secret Documents, WikiLeaks Seeks 'Transparency, 'N. Y. TImEs,
July 25, 2010, at All; Scott Shane & Andrew W. Lehren, Leaked Cables Offer a
Raw Look Inside U.S. Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 29, 2010, at Al.
88. For more information on this process, see Sedler, supra note 66.
When discussing the "The Media and National Security" with a panel of govern-
ment officials and media representatives, one of the matters discussed by the
panel was the interaction between the media and government officials with
respect to the disclosure of information involving issues of national security. All
the panelists agreed that it was rare for the government to try to persuade the
media to not publish an entire story. Rather, the government's concern was to
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In an op-ed published in the New York Times in 2006, Dean
Baquet, then the editor of the Los Angeles Times, and Bill Kel-
ler, the executive editor of the New York Times, set forth an edi-
torial view on how the media balances national security with its
mission to report the news." They first point out that
[i]n recent years our papers have brought you a great deal
of information the White House never intended for you to
know-classified secrets about the questionable intelli-
gence that led the country to war in Iraq, about the abuse
of prisoners in Iraq and Afghanistan, about the transfer of
suspects to countries that are not squeamish about using
torture, about eavesdropping without warrants.9 0
They then ask, "How do we, as editors, reconcile the obliga-
tion to inform with the instinct to protect?"" They answer that
"[s]ometimes the judgments are easy," such as their reporters in
Iraq and Afghanistan "taking great care not to divulge opera-
tional intelligence in their news reports, knowing that in this
wired age it could be seen and used by the enemy."" But often
the judgments are "painfully hard."" The process, they say,
begins with reporting.9 4 The reporters work with sources "who
may be scared, who may know only part of the story, who may
have their own agendas that. need to be discovered and taken
into account."" "We double check and triple check. We seek
out sources with different points of view. We challenge our
sources when contradictory information emerges."96
The next step is hearing the government's case. Baquet and
Keller say that no article on a classified program gets published
prevent the publication of particular information contained in a story. A typical
situation was the government saying to a reporter, "We have a real problem
with this story. Can you take some facts out of the story?" Facts that the govern-
ment typically wants to remove from stories are those relating to the location or
assistance from foreign governments that those governments would prefer to
keep secret. From the standpoint of the government official making the
request, it is "Trust me on this one." From the standpoint of the editor-the
request not to disclose always goes to a top editor-it is a matter of trying to
accommodate the request by winnowing down the story to "what is really impor-
tant." Id. at 1030.
89. Dean Baquet & Bill Keller, Wen Do We Publish A Secret?, N.Y. TIMES,
July 1, 2006, at A15.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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until the responsible officials have been given a fair opportunity
to comment.9 7 More significantly, they say:
[I]f the [responsible officials] want to argue that publica-
tion represents a danger to national security, we put things
on hold and give them a respectful hearing. Often we
agree to participate in off-the-record conversations with
officials, so that they can make their case without fear of
spilling more secrets onto our front pages.:
97. Id.
98. Id. When WikiLeaks posted some 91,000 leaked classified documents
on the Afghanistan war on its Web site, it justified the disclosure as an effort to
reveal "unethical behavior" by governments and corporations. Schmitt, supra
note 87.
"We believe that transparency in government leads to reduced corrup-
tion, better government and stronger democracies," the organization's
Web site says. "All governments can benefit from increased scrutiny by
the world community, as well as their own people. We believe this scru-
tiny required information." . . . In a telephone interview from London,
the organization's founder, Julian Assange, said the documents would
reveal broader and more pervasive violence in Afghanistan than the
military or the news media had previously reported. "It shows not only
the severe incidents but the general squalor of war, from the death of
individual children to major operations that kills hundreds," he said.
Id. Schmitt's report notes that WikiLeaks did exercise some degree of editorial
discretion when it "withheld some 15,000 documents from release until its tech-
nicians could redact names of individuals in the reports whose safety could be
jeopardized." Id. WikiLeaks also claimed that it had discussed the proposed
disclosure with Pentagon officials, and that the Pentagon had "expressed a will-
ingness to discuss reviewing a trove of classified documents before public
release," but the Pentagon disputed this claim, saying that it would "not negoti-
ate some 'minimized' or 'sanitized' version of a release by WikiLeaks of addi-
tional U.S. government classified documents." Thom Shanker, WikiLeaks and
Pentagon Disagree About Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2010, at A10. In a later devel-
opment, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates informed Senator Carl Levin, the
Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee that, "while the release of
75,000 classified documents about the war in Afghanistan by the Web site
WikiLeaks endangered the lives of Afghans helping the United States, the dis-
closures did not reveal any significant national intelligence secrets." Elisabeth
Bumiller, Gates Found Cost of Leaks Was Limited, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2010, at A8.
Similarly, with respect to the disclosure of 250,000 diplomatic cables, Secretary
Gates noted that descriptions of the leaks as a "melt-down, a ... game-changer,
and so on" were "fairly significantly overwrought." Elizabeth Bumiller, On Dis-
closures, Gates Takes the Long View, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2010, at A12. He said:
The fact is, governments deal with the United States because it is in
their interest, not because they like us, not because they trust us, and
not because they believe we can keep secrets.... [Slome governments
. . . deal with us because they fear us, some because they respect us,
most because they need us. We are still ... indispensable. . . . So other
nations will continue to deal with us. . . . We will continue to share
sensitive information with one another. Is this embarrassing? Yes. Is
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They then give examples of decisions that they have made to
hold an article or to eliminate some facts."
In the final analysis, they make the decisions:
We understand that honorable people may disagree with
any of these choices-to publish or not to publish. But
making those decisions is the responsibility that falls to edi-
tors-to publish or not to publish. But making those deci-
sions is the responsibility that falls to editors, a corollary to
the great gift of our independence. It is not a responsibil-
ity we take lightly. And it is not one that we can surrender
to the government.' 00
it awkward? Yes. Consequences for U.S. foreign policy? I think fairly
modest.
Id.
99. Baquet & Keller, supra note 89. Baquet and Keller note that in the
past few years they have each withheld or delayed an article when Federal Offi-
cials convinced them that the risk of publication outweighed the benefits. Simi-
larly, the New York Times withheld the article on telephone eavesdropping for
more than a year "until editors felt that further reporting had whittled away the
administration's case for secrecy." Id. The paper further maintains that it did
not publish articles that "might have jeopardized efforts to protect vulnerable
stockpiles of nuclear material and articles about highly sensitive counterterror-
ism initiatives that are still in operation." Id. The Los Angeles Times disclosed
that it withheld information about American espionage and surveillance activi-
ties in Afghanistan discovered on computer drives purchased by reporters in an
Afghan bazaar. Editors there noted one way they dealt with security concerns
was "by editing out gratuitous detail that lends little to public understanding
but might be useful to the targets of surveillance." Id. An additional example
of this situation was the Washington Post's agreement-made at the Bush
Administration's request-not to name the specific countries that had secret
Central Intelligence Agency prisons. Id.
100. Id. Keller recently discussed the New York Times' decision to publish
the diplomatic cables obtained by WikiLeaks. He pointed out that the Times
made its decision about what cables to publish independently of WikiLeaks'
own publication decisions. See Bill Keller, A Note to Readers: The Decision to Pub-
lish Diplomatic Documents, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2010, at A10. He further noted
that
[t]he Times has taken care to exclude, in its articles and in supple-
mentary material, in print and online, information that would endan-
ger confidential informants or compromise national security. The
Times' redactions were shared with other news organizations and
communicated to WikiLeaks, in the hope that they would similarly
edit the documents they planned to post online.
Id. Editors at the Times next sent to Obama Administration officials the docu-
ments they planned to post to "invit[e] them to challenge publication of any
information that, in the official view, would harm the national interest." The
Administration officials, after "making clear that they condemn the publication
of secret material," suggested additional redactions, some of which were made.
Keller also discussed how editors attempted to balance concern for national
security with the paper's mission to report the news:
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Schoenfeld, the senior editor of Commentary, espouses a
different view about the responsibility of the media with respect
to government secrets in "the life-and-death area of national
security.""o" Schoenfeld takes as his starting point the New York
Times' disclosure of the National Security Agency's domestic sur-
veillance program, and maintains that "there is a well-founded
principle that newspapers do not carry a shield that automatically
allows them to publish whatever they wish," and further that, "the
press can and should be held to account for publishing military
secrets in wartime."' 0 2 However, as Schoenfeld notes, "[iut is
hardly surprising that, over the decades, successful prosecution
of the recipients and purveyors of leaked secret government
information has been as rare as leaks of such information have
become abundant."' But, legality aside, Schoenfeld raises the
question of "whether, in the aftermath of September 11, we as a
The question of dealing with classified information is rarely easy, and
never to be taken lightly. Editors try to balance the value of the mate-
rial to public understanding against potential dangers to the national
interest. As a general rule, we withhold secret information that would
expose confidential sources to reprisals or that would reveal opera-
tional intelligence that might be useful to adversaries in war. We
excise material that might lead terrorists to unsecured weapons mate-
rial, compromise intelligence-gathering programs aimed at hostile
countries, or disclose information about the capabilities of American
weapons that could be helpful to an enemy. On the other hand, we
are less likely to censor candid remarks simply because they might
cause a diplomatic controversy or embarrass officials.
Id.
101. Schoenfeld, supra note 86, at 23.
102. Id. at 26.
103. Id. at 24. As discussed supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text, the
disclosure of information that the government wishes to keep secret on
national security grounds can only be prohibited where the government makes
a strong showing that the disclosure of the information would cause "direct,
immediate and irreparable damage" to a particular national security interest.
The disclosure of the National Security Agency's domestic surveillance program
does not meet this exacting test, and so is constitutionally protected. There is
no question that the government may constitutionally impose sanctions-
including criminal prosecution-on government employees who leak informa-
tion because the employee cannot successfully assert a First Amendment right
to violate the oath of secrecy. See United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057 (4th
Cir. 1988). Morrison was employed at the Naval Intelligence Support Center
and had a Top Secret security clearance. In connection with his security clear-
ance, he had signed a non-disclosure agreement. He had also been doing work
for Jane's Fighting Ships, an English publication providing current information
on naval operations internationally. He took certain secure satellite photo-
graphs of a Soviet aircraft carrier under construction in a Black Sea naval ship-
yard and sent them to Jane's. Morison was convicted under the Espionage Act,
18 U.S.C. §§ 641, 793(d) (e), for transmitting secret documents to "one not
entitled to receive them." Morison, 844 F.2d at 1060. The court summarily
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nation can afford to permit the reporters and editors of a great
newspaper to become the unelected authority that determines
for us all what is a legitimate secret and what is not."io4 Carried
to its logical conclusion, Schoenfeld's position is that the media
should not be publishing military secrets in wartime.'0o
Obviously, many media organizations disagree with that
position, and as we have seen, they frequently publish what
Schoenfeld calls "government secrets in wartime.""o6 For better
or worse, because of the strength of the First Amendment in the
American constitutional system,'0 7 only the media can decide
rejected his claim that the First Amendment protected the transmittal. Id. at
1068.
It may also be assumed that if members of the media played some role in
the illegal acquisition of the leaked material, as where a reporter or editor con-
spired with or paid the government employee to provide the media with the
material, that non-governmental person could be prosecuted for its actions
along with the government employee. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514
(2001) (holding that where members of the media played no role in the illegal
interception of a telephone conversation, media outlets could not be prose-
cuted for publishing the illegally intercepted information). The Court made it
clear that if members of the media had engaged in illegal conduct, it could be
prosecuted for engaging in that conduct. Id. at 528.
The United States government has thus far been unsuccessful in its efforts
to show thatJulian Assange, the founder of WikiLeaks, actively solicited or was
otherwise involved in the leaks. See Charlie Savage, US. Prosecutors, Weighing
Wikileaks Charges, Hit the Law Books, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 8, 2010, at A12. The article
notes that
[i]f Mr. Assange did collaborate in the original disclosure, then prose-
cutors could charge him with conspiracy in the underlying leak, skirt-
ing the question of whether the subsequent publication of the
documents constituted a separate criminal offense. But while investi-
gators have looked for such evidence, there is no public sign sug-
gesting that they have found any.
Id.
104. Schoenfeld, supra note 86, at 31.
105. Id. Again, it must be noted that Schoenfeld's position does not
account for the Constitutional concerns about government censorship. Fur-
ther, the argument does not define what a "military secret" is. Schoenfeld
develops this position more strongly elsewhere. See SCHOENFELD, supra note 79,
at 248-75. He concludes: "[T]he conduct of the press today raises the question
posed by James Schlesinger of whether the free society built by the Founders
can defend itself, and not only from external dangers but also from those who
would subvert democracy by placing themselves above the law." Id. The book
discusses in great detail past and contemporary disclosure of "necessary secrets"
by the media and disaffected government officials. Notwithstanding the
author's strong advocacy of his position, the book is a valuable resource for
understanding this highly controversial subject in all of its aspects.
106. Schoenfeld, supra note 86, at 24.
107. See Sedler, supra note 2 (discussing the strength of the First Amend-
ment in the American constitutional system).
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whether to publish government secrets in wartime. If the
media's publication of government secrets in wartime somehow
impedes the government in its war on terrorism, this is the price
that we have chosen to pay for living under a constitutional sys-
tem in which the value of freedom of expression takes prece-
dence over other values, including the value of national security.
The positive side of the equation is that the government cannot
operate in secret, that its actions are subject to public scrutiny
and criticism, and that the pressure of public opinion, sometimes
manifested in Congressional action, may force a change in gov-
ernment policy. For example, in the wake of public criticism fol-
lowing the media disclosure of the National Security Agency's
domestic surveillance program, the Bush Administration
announced that in the future, it would seek warrants for such
surveillance from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.'
In addition, Congress made legislative changes that actually
expanded the authority of the government to seek warrants for
such surveillance.o' The public debate over surveillance of com-
munications directed toward American citizens-and indeed the
public debate over all governmental activities in the war on ter-
rorism-is the result of the media's relentless disclosure of those
activities and is in the best traditions of the First Amendment.
And in the midst of all the controversy over the Internet leak of
some 91,000 classified documents on the Afghanistan war and
250,000 American diplomatic cables by WikiLeaks, it cannot be
doubted that the disclosure of these documents made the Ameri-
can public exponentially more informed about the many facets
of American involvement in Afghanistan and about the numer-
ous issues of American foreign policy reflected in the once-secret
diplomatic cables.'1 0
108. See Eric Lichtblau & DavidJohnston, Court to Oversee U.S. Wiretapping
in Terror Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2007, at Al.
109. See Scott Shane, Senate Panel to See Papers on Agency's Eavesdropping,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 26, 2007, at A22. The law embodying these changes, however,
was only effective for six months. In connection with the Congressional debate
over reauthorization, the White House agreed to share secret documents of the
National Security Agency's domestic surveillance program with the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee. Id.
110. See Katrin Bennhold, State's Secrets: Cables Mostly Laud French Friend
with 'Mercurial' Side, N.Y. TIMEs Dec. 1, 2010, at A13; William J. Brand, James
Glanz & David E. Sanger, Iran Fortifies its Arsenal with the Aid of North Korea, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 29, 2010, at A12; C.J. Chivers, Embracing Georgia, US. Misread Signs of
Region's Rifts, Cables Show, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 2, 2010, at A17; C.J. Chivers, State's
Secrets Day 4: Below Surface, U.S. Harbors Dim View of Putin and Russia, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 2, 2010, at Al; Helene Cooper & Carlotta Gall, Cables Depict a Roller-Coaster
Trajectory for Karzai, from Exalted to Baffling, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2010, at Al4; Alan
Cowell, Leaked Cables Shed Light on an Ex-K.G.B. Officer's 2006 Death in London,
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But, in some circumstances, the media has concluded that it
is in the public interest to exercise its editorial discretion to with-
hold or delay the publication of particular information on the
ground that the disclosure of this information will be harmful to
national security. Here too, when the media puts the public
interest in national security above the public interest in disclo-
sure of the information, the media likewise is acting in the best
traditions of the First Amendment. For in the American consti-
tutional system, the essential values of the First Amendment
require that the media, and not the government, make the deter-
mination whether the public interest is better served by the dis-
closure of particular information or by the withholding of that
information.'
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2010, at A16; Rachel Donadio & Celestine Bohlen, Caustic
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N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2010, at A7; Mark Mazzetti & William J. Broad, State's Secrets
Day 5: Wider Window into Iran's Missile Capabilities Offers a Murkier View, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 3, 2010, at A15; Mark Mazzetti, U.S. Expands Role of Diplomats in
Spying, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2010, at Al; Jane Perlez, David E. Sanger & Eric
Schmitt, State's Secrets Day 3: Wary Dance with Pakistan in Nuclear World, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 2010, at Al; David E. Sanger, James Glanz & Jo Becher, From
Arabs and Israelis, Sharp Distress Over a Nuclear Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2010, at
Al; Charlie Savage, U.S. Diplomats Fretted About Canadians with a 'Chip on Their
Shoulder,' N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2010, at A17; Eric Schmitt, Angry at U.S., Libya
Delayed Deal for Disposal of Nuclear Fuel, Cables Say, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2010, at A6;
Scott Shane, Mark Mazzetti & Dexter Filkins, State's Secrets Day 5: Pervasive
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State's Secrets Day 6: Yemen Sets the Terms for a War on Al Queda, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4,
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111. See generally Keller, supra note 100, at A10; Bill Keller, Dealing With
Assange and the WikiLeaks Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2011, at MM32 ("A free
press in a democracy can be messy. But the alternative is to give the govern-
ment a veto over what citizens are allowed to know."). The question of whether
the public interest is better served by the disclosure of the particular informa-
tion or by the withholding of that information has clearly come to the fore with
respect to the disclosure of the leaked WikiLeaks classified documents and dip-
lomatic cables. In explaining the decision of the New York Times to publish the
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IV. CONCLUSION
In this Article I have approached self-censorship in terms of
"self-censorship bad" and "self-censorship good." I have
explained how the principles, doctrines, and precedents of what
I have referred to as the "law of the First Amendment" are
designed to prevent "self-censorship bad" due to the fear of gov-
ernmental sanctions against expression.
In this connection I have discussed the chilling effect con-
cept, the narrow specificity principle, the overbreadth doctrine,
the New York Times rule, and the use of the chilling effect concept
as the basis for invalidating the regulation of expression. The
result of the Court's use of the chilling effect concept and the
principle, doctrines, and precedents derived from that concept
has been to advance the public interest in the dissemination of
information and ideas, and so to strongly implement the values
of the First Amendment.
At the same time, I have explained how the First Amend-
ment right to silence serves as the basis for the media's exercise
of its editorial discretion to make the determination that it is in
the public interest for it to refuse to disclose information in its
position. When it makes that determination, it has concluded
that in the circumstances presented, other values, such as a con-
cern for an individual's privacy or a concern for national security,
outweigh the public's interest in obtaining that information. I
have illustrated the media's application of editorial discretion by
the refusal of the media to disclose the identity of rape victims
and by its refusal to disclose certain information that it concludes
will be harmful to the national security. I have explained that
under the law of the First Amendment, the government cannot
constitutionally prohibit the media from disclosing the identity
of rape victims or from disclosing information that the govern-
ment considers harmful to national security. The decision to dis-
diplomatic cables, following some redaction and discussion with Obama
Administration officials, executive editor Bill Keller stated as follows:
But the more important reason to publish these articles is that the
cables tell the unvarnished story of how the government makes its big-
gest decisions, the decisions that cost the country most heavily in lives
and money. They shed light on the motivations-and, in some cases,
duplicity-of allies on the receiving end of American courtship and
foreign aid. They illuminate the diplomacy surrounding two current
wars and several countries, like Pakistan and Yemen, where American
military involvement is growing. As daunting as it is to publish such
material over official objections, it would be presumptuous to con-
clude that Americans have no right to know what is being done in
their name.
Keller, supra note 100, at A10.
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close or not to disclose in both instances is a decision that under
the First Amendment is for the media and the media alone to
make.
In the final analysis, then, we rely on the strong protections
of the First Amendment to prevent "self-censorship bad" and on
the First Amendment rights of the media to bring about "self-
censorship good." It is the First Amendment and the values that
the First Amendment seeks to promote that determine the
nature of self-censorship in American society.

